Research on the Methods of Compliance and Verification Technology Based on FAR 33.28  by Xiaofeng, Liu
Procedia Engineering 17 (2011) 559 – 566
1877-7058 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2011.10.069
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Procedia 
Engineering 
          Procedia Engineering  00 (2011) 000–000
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
The 2nd International Symposium on Aircraft Airworthiness (ISAA 2011)
Research on the Methods of Compliance and Verification 
Technology Based on FAR 33.28
LIU Xiaofenga,b,*
aSchool of Transportation Science and Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, P.R. China, 100191
bAirworthiness Technologies Research Center, National Laboratory of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing, P.R. China, 100191
Abstract
The methods of compliance presented here will enable improved verification technology to aero engines electrical 
and electronic control system. The approach is based on FAR 33.28, and the scope of this paper is to research the 
history of 33.28 and its amendments. Furthermore, combined with the current development of aircraft engine control 
system, this paper gives the compliance method to this regulation.
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1. Introduction
Safety is a concept generally ingrained in the human mind; we will consider ‘absence of danger’ as its 
principal definition. Safety is something related to all human activities and therefore every civil society is 
organized (or should be organized) to guarantee public safety in relation to one’s own or others’ activities. 
This is certainly a moral obligation, but it is also a practical demand because accidents, causing damage to 
persons and properties, have a social cost. This is also the reason why human activities that could cause 
damage to persons and properties are controlled by national states through regulations. Safety is a very 
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important property of a safety critical system whose failure may lead to grave dangers to human life and 
property. It is a measure of the continuous delivery of service free from occurrences of catastrophic 
failures. Safety analysis of such a system has been recognized as a compulsory process for ensuring its 
safety in deployment.
A definition of airworthiness can be found in the Italian RAI-ENAC Technical Regulations: ‘For an 
aircraft, or aircraft part, airworthiness is the possession of the necessary requirements for flying in safe 
conditions, within allowable limits.’[1] The term of airworthiness, as defined by the FAA (Federal 
Aviation Administration) in briefings for the committee, refers to the safety and physical integrity of an 
aircraft, including its component parts and subsystems, its performance capabilities, and its handling 
characteristics. It is illegal in most countries to fly an aircraft without first obtaining an airworthiness 
certificate from the responsible government agency. In the United States, Title 14, Code of Federal 
Regulations, Part 91.7 states [2]:
(a) No person may operate an aircraft unless it is in an airworthy condition.
(b) The pilot in command of a civil aircraft is responsible for determining whether that aircraft is in 
condition for safe flight. The pilot in command shall discontinue the flight when unairworthy mechanical, 
electrical, or structural conditions occur.
With the development of science and technology of aviation and civil aviation, as well as the 
deepening of aviation safety, the concept of airworthiness is still continuous developed. Airworthiness 
characteristics are as followed: (1) It is the final destination to ensure the flight safety; (2) The 
airworthiness process encompasses the entire system (including the whole, parts, subsystems, but also the 
quality of performance and operational safety), and the whole lifetime of aeronautical products; (3) To 
make the expected operating environment and restrictions on use as the promise, airworthiness puts 
emphasis on experience and maintenance factors.
The electronic electrical and electronic control system is a well-publicized new technology which 
western countries’ aviation industries have pioneered for civil aircraft applications on modern aircrafts 
and subsequent models. Although primarily selected in order to provide low installed weight coupled with 
system reliability and a new standard of handling qualities for the pilot, an electrical and electronic control 
system (EEC) has a direct and an indirect influence to system safety[3-4].
Airworthiness regulations are, of course, intended to contribute towards ensuring that an aircraft is safe 
for flight. In practice, this is achieved by prescribing design conditions which, when met, will ensure the 
required level of safety. It is usually far better for both manufacturers and regulators that this is achieved 
by good initial design rather than through enormous effort to demonstrate compliance of a weak design. 
This paper gives the methods of compliance for aero engines airworthiness certification, and describes 
how the methods of compliance with the aero engines control system airworthiness regulations.
2. Revision history of FAR 33.28
FAR 33 which set forth airworthiness standards for aircraft engines became effective on February 1, 
1965. So far, the FAR 33.28 has been amended twice, which are FAA-Amdt.33-15 (08/16/1993) and 
FAA-Amdt.33-26 (10/20/2008).
With the advent of the gas turbine engine, more sophisticated fuel controls were needed to control an 
engine than the simple carburetor that was used to control aircraft engines. The primary function of any 
engine fuel control is to maintain as efficient, combustible fuel-to-air ratio in response to any power input 
command. The gas turbine engine introduced additional requirements for engine fuel controls because the 
engine compressor would stall and surge for certain combinations of pressure ratio across the compressor 
and the compressor rotor speed. Engine fuel controls have been designed to avoid this compressor stall 
region throughout the aircraft operating envelope and for all pilot power lever commands. In addition, the 
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engine fuel control was designed to protect the engine from exceeding its design limits for temperature, 
speed, and pressure. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the gas turbine engine and fuel control 
technology were being developed, a rudimentary analog computational technology was available to 
implement these controls either electronically or hydromechanically. Engine controls based on each 
approach were being developed. However, the analog electronic fuel control technology developed more 
quickly, and the initial gas turbine engines were controlled with full authority electronic controls, albeit 
using vacuum tubes. Early models of engines on the U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber were fitted with these 
electronic engine controls. However, the electronic controls were superseded by the hydromechanical 
controls because they demonstrated an improved reliability over the electronic engine controls.
From the 1950s to the late 1970s, semiconductor technology became available and advanced rapidly 
from translators, through various levels of integration, and operational amplifiers, to solid state memories 
and microprocessors. Until the late 1970s, the electronic engine controls were used only to perform 
functions to protect the engine from exceeding design limits for temperature, speed, pressure, or torque. 
The full authority analog electronic engine control on the Concorde aircraft and a few engines with 
limited authority controls were the exceptions to this generalization. The 1973 oil crisis created an urgent 
need in the commercial aviation industry for more fuel efficient engines. In the mid-1970s, research and 
development programs to develop full authority digital engine controls (FADEC) were initiated by 
various commercial and military engineering groups. Two FADEC systems developed under one of the 
commercial demonstration programs were test flown in 1980 on an experimental Boeing 747 aircraft. In 
the late 1970s, supervisory controls were used on large transport engines certificated by General Electric 
(GE), Pratt & Whitney (PW), and Rolls Royce (RR). These controls enhanced engine performance and 
functioned similar to a FADEC, but were limited to less than 50 percent authority of thrust and did not 
control the engine start. Subsequently, in 1983, the PWA PW2037 became the first U.S. commercial 
engine to be certificated with a FADEC system.
In June 1977, the FAA issued Notice No. 77-6, Aircraft Regulatory Review Program, Invitation to 
Submit Proposals for Consideration (42 FR 29687, June 9, 1977). This notice was issued in response to 
the need to update and modernize technical requirements, and for clarification and elimination of 
redundancies in test and design requirements. The FAA solicited rule change proposals from the aviation 
community and the general public, and held a week-long Regulatory Review Conference in January 1978, 
attended by over 100 industry and public representatives.
In June 1984, the FAA invited interested parties to an Electronic Engine Control Conference in 
Burlington, Massachusetts. The FAA objective was to provide a forum that would encourage the 
participation of the attendees from industry and government agencies in discussion of the technical 
aspects of the proposed regulations. The meeting was attended by more than 100 industry and public 
representatives. Five presentations were made, one of which was an FAA presentation entitled "Technical 
Approach to Regulation."
The first amendment of FAR 33.28, the FAA addressed the following matters that it believed should be 
included in the forthcoming rule change that addressed EEC systems: (1) Degree of Authority-Full; (2) 
Software Design; (3) Backup and Alternative Control Systems; (4) Power Sources--Independent vs 
Aircraft Supplied; (5) Environmental Limits--Lightning Protection; (6) Aircraft supplied Data and Crew 
Alerting.
State-of-the-art technology has led to the development of more complex and more nearly automated 
control systems for aircraft engines. There is no known increased cost impacts over current industry 
practice associated with the proposed rule. This proposed rule codifies and standardizes the existing FAA 
practice with regard to the certification of engine control systems, particularly with those systems that are 
electrical or electronic in nature and more recently with the full authority digital electronic control 
(FADEC) system of the Pratt & Whitney 2037 turbine engine. Because these systems are state-of-the-art 
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and there are presently no definitive regulations which provide for their certification, the FAA has relied 
upon generalized interpretations of the FAR, Advisory Circular information, and other aviation committee 
documentation to allow for certification on a case-by-case basis. The FAR rules which have been applied 
generally to the certification of electronic and electrical engine control system include Part 25.901, 
Installation; Part 33.75, Safety Analysis; and Part 33.91, Engine Components Tests. None of these rules, 
however, provide explicit requirements with regard to engine controls. In consonance with existing FAA 
practice, this proposed rule underlies the FAA's intent to promulgate a regulation which institutes 
functional objective requirements rather than mandate design requirements in order to accomplish the 
certification of engine control systems.
Electronic controls vary from a simple trimming device with full hydromechanical control backup to a 
complex, full authority, digital system with no mechanical backup. The operation of mechanical and 
analog electronic control systems may be verified by testing, since measured outputs are continuous 
functions of known inputs and dedicated hardware is used to perform each function. However, control 
systems based on digital computer technology are discontinuous and use shared hardware resources which 
cannot be completely tested. Although discontinuities can be made small, they raise the problem of 
finding if any are larger than expected and finding the set of circumstances which would cause them to 
occur. Undiscovered software errors which could cause significant discontinuities, rather than failures, are 
the primary concern. As all engines on an aircraft could experience such as effect simultaneously, the 
resulting loss of power could be greater than a single engine failure. To identify these discontinuities by 
testing would require tests for each and every combination of individual inputs. Since this is impractical, 
the method used for the design of the system software must be a part of the certification review. Therefore, 
the need has become evident for an addition to Part 33 of the FAR that establishes and standardizes the 
certification basis for electrical and electronic engine control systems for aero engines.
3. Research of MoC and verification technology
3.1. Functions of MoC
The MoC (Methods of Compliance) are the categorization of the means used to demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements. A requirement can be complied with, for example, by a flight test, a 
static test, and/or a substantiation report. The MoC definition is a very important phase of the certification 
process because it lays the foundations of the job to be carried out. For this reason, the authority’s team 
and the applicant must agree with it and in sufficient detail to ensure good mutual understanding. The 
characteristics of MoC are:
1. The goal is to clearly testify whether the product design is accord with the airworthiness 
requirements, the airworthiness requirements can either follow airworthiness term or specialized technical 
conditions and other airworthiness' regulation requirements.
2. The type approval qualification's supervisor (representative) will supervise the whole experiment 
process.
3. The experiment outline, test specimen graph design and lab report should be approval by the censor 
representative in order to take compliance verification.
The MoC definition is a very important phase of the certification process because it lays the 
foundations of the job to be carried out. For this reason, the authority’s team and the applicant must agree 
with it and in sufficient detail to ensure good mutual understanding.
563LIU Xiaofeng / Procedia Engineering 17 (2011) 559 – 566LI  iaofeng / rocedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000 000 5
3.2. Difference between aircraft with aero engine on MoC
Method of Compliance (MoC) is a particular method of compliance that requires directorate or policy
office coordination as a result of peculiarities in the type design or the need to define specific conditions 
and/or establish the environment under which substantiation must be shown.
Table 1. MOC of aircrafts
No. MOC Description
MC0 Declaration
Usually directly gives the compliance checklist or 
compliance record file is given
MC1 Documentation
Such as technical specifications, installation drawings, 
calculations, verification plan and aircraft manuals….
MC2 Analysis/Calculation
Such as load, static strength and fatigue strength,
performance, statistics, data analysis, the similarity with 
previous models…
MC3 Safety assessment
Such as preliminary risk analysis, fault tree analysis, failure 
mode, effect and criticality analysis, software quality pan…
safety objectives and requirements for presentation of
documents has been achieved goals
MC4 Laboratory test
Static and fatigue tests, environment tests…test may be for 
components, sub-assemblies and assemblies
MC5 Ground test
Rotor and gearbox durability tests, the ambient temperature 
tests
MC6 Flight test
Used when regulations requirements clarified and other 
methods cannot demonstrate
MC7 Inspection
Such as system isolated checks, inspection and maintenance 
requirements…
MC8 Simulator test
Such as the assessment of the potential risk, cockpit 
assessment…
MC9 Equipment eligibility
Suitability of the expected functionally, performance in 
critical environment…probably recorded in design and 
performance declarations.
The difference between aero engines with aircraft is issued below:
(1) Working environment
Aircrafts working environment is relatively fixed, small temperature changes (about changes in the 
100K range), while the hot components of aero engines operating temperature range about 1500K.
(2) Transient characteristic
There is a smooth transition in aircrafts operation under various atmospheric conditions, while, in 
order to withstand a short period of time at large temperature, transient effects during the spool speed 
changes cannot be ignored in aero engines.
(3) Coupling characteristic
Strongly coupled with multi-physics, for the hot components in aero engines, the hot shells, gas shells 
is widespread. Multi-component strongly coupled in aero engines to a highly complex integrated system, 
coupling effects are more obvious.
(4) Difference of risk mechanisms
High-temperature, high-speed, self-excited vibration, strongly coupled, strong transient characteristics
in aero engines, are particular to engines, so aero engines are more complex mechanism of the risk of 
many dangerous mechanism is unclear.
According to the four difference between aero engines with aircrafts, the MoC of aero engines are also 
different, below table 2 gives a MoC set:
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Table 2. MOC of aero engines
Abbreviation. MoC Description
I Inspection Check the structural integrity of components
ST Specimen Test
For some parts, assembly sampling tests, such as 
static and fatigue tests
RT Rig Test
Used for air system, oil system, control system 
verification test
CT Component Test
Such as high temperature, high load turbine blade 
cooling effect of the test, such as thrust vectoring 
nozzle test
ET Engine Test
Test under system integrity, such as the swallow bird, 
swallow the ice, the ignition performance tests and 
performance life test
FT Flight Test
Other methods can not verify the content or the 
problem cannot be exposure may be to complete the 
flight test
D Document
Such as technical specifications, installation 
drawings, calculations show that the program, engine 
manuals, etc.
S Similarity
Instructions to be certified models and previous 
models have been evidence of similarity in some 
respects, simplifies the process of evidence derived 
from models
A Analysis
Regulations explicitly require that other methods 
cannot demonstrate compliance
M Modeling
This is calculated by means of model analysis and to 
prove that the design meets airworthiness 
requirements of the terms
SA Safety Analysis
This method is through FMEA, FTA and other failure 
analysis tools for the design safety assessment, verify 





Compliance engineering analysis methods, the 
application calls the works in the database, the 
database contains the project assumptions, project 
model, the event has occurred, the empirical formula 
and other engineering factors
4. MoC FOR FAR 33.28
Table 3. MoC for FAR 33.28
Regulation No. MoC Description
(a) D
The document may have technical specifications, control 
system or devices.
(b)(1)(i) S, A, ET
If the control system is derived from a current type, the 
similarity analysis can evidence. Analysis and engine test also 
can be used to verify the compliance of the control limits.
(b)(1)(ii) S, A, ET
If the control system is derived from a current type, the 
similarity analysis can evidence. Analysis and engine test also 
can be used to verify the compliance of the control limits.
(b)(1)(iii) S, A, RT
If the control system is derived from a current type, the 
similarity analysis can evidence. Analysis and hardware-in-
loop simulation also can be used to verify the compliance of 
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Regulation No. MoC Description
the control limits.
(b)(1)(iv) S, A, RT, ET
If the control system is derived from a current type, the 
similarity analysis can evidence. Analysis engine test and 
hardware-in-loop simulation also can be used to verify the 
compliance of the control limits.
(b)(2) ET, SA, D
Safety analysis is required for the environment hazard, 
including HIRF, EMI, etc. Besides the analysis, Engine test 
for safety is also available for this specification
(c)(1)(i) RT, ET
Engine test and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used to 
verify the compliance of the control transitions.
(c)(1)(ii) RT, ET, A
Engine, analysis and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used 
to verify the compliance of the control transitions limits.
(c)(1)(iii) RT, ET, D
Engine test and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used to 
verify the compliance of the control transitions such as surge, 
stall and unacceptable change of thrust or power.
(c)(2) D, A
The engine manuals may document the altitude changes of 
thrust or power and transition time
(d)(1) SA
Using safety assessment methods introduced by SAE ARP-
4761[5-6], analyzes the probability of LOTC/LOPC.
(d)(2) SA
Using safety assessment methods introduced by SAE ARP-
4761, analyzes the single fault in control system.
(d)(3) SA
Using safety assessment methods introduced by SAE ARP-
4761, analyzes the control system safety.
(e) SA Safety analysis, FHA, FTA, FMEA, CCA.
(f)(1) SA ,RT
Safety analysis and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used 
to verify the compliance of the control protections.
(f)(2) SA, RT
Safety analysis and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used 
to verify the compliance of the control protections.
(f)(3) RT, ET, SA
Safety analysis, engine test and hardware-in-loop simulation 
can be used to verify the compliance of the control 
protections.
(g) A, RT
Hardware-in-loop simulation can be used to verify the 
compliance of the control and according to RTCA DO-178B 
and FAA Oreder, analyzes the software design procedure.
(h)(1) SA
Safety analysis can be used to verify the compliance of the 
aircraft supplied data.
(h)(2) RT, SA
Hardware-in-loop simulation can be used to verify the 
compliance of the control plan and analyzes the safety of the 
aircraft supplied data
(i)(1)(i) SA
Safety analysis can be used to verify the compliance of the 
aircraft supplied electrical power.
(i)(1)(ii) SA
Safety analysis can be used to verify the compliance of the 
aircraft supplied electrical power.
(i)(2) RT, SA
Safety analysis and engine test can be used to verify the 
compliance of the aircraft supplied electrical power.
(i)(3) RT, D
Hardware-in-loop simulation can be used to verify the 
compliance of the aircraft supplied electrical power including
transient and steady state voltage limits and declares in the 
engine instructions for installation.
(i)(4) RT, D
Hardware-in-loop simulation can be used to verify the 
compliance of the aircraft supplied electrical power and must 
test the normal operation when aircraft supplied electrical 
power returns to within the declared limits.
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Regulation No. MoC Description
(j) SA
Safety analysis can be used to verify the compliance of the air 
pressure signal.
(k) ET, RT
Engine, analysis and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used 
to verify the compliance of the OEI.
(l) RT, ET, SA
Engine, analysis and hardware-in-loop simulation can be used 
to verify the compliance of the shut-down method and safety 
analysis also can be used to verify the probability of un-
shutdown.
(m) SA
According to RTCA DO-178B and FAA Order analyses the 
PLC design procedure.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we discussed the MoC of aero engines and gave the MoC for FAR 33.28. Engine control 
system is the most complex and highest level of functional integration. Especially for the engine FADEC 
system, numbers of the interfaces and functions are huge, and complexity of the system is very high, 
therefore, the method of compliance is correspondingly very numerous.
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